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In California criminal trials, a police officer may testify as
to information supplied by a confidential informant' without dis-
closing the informant's identity. The police informant is con-
sidered an important law enforcement tool and a large number
of arrests result from the information provided by informants.
Thus, the identity of police informants traditionally has been pro-
tected by the privilege of nondisclosure on the theory that law
enforcement would be less effective if disclosure were com-
pelled.2 The United States Supreme Court has upheld this com-
mon law privilege3 and it has been codified in California Evidence
Code section 1042(d).' Under the privilege, the officer's testi-
* B.A., 1970, J.D., 1973, University of California at Los Angeles; member
Los Angeles County Bar Assoc. Barristers Task Force on Jails, 1974-75; member,
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1. An "informant" or "informer" is a person who gives information to the
police concerning violations of the law. The California Supreme Court uses the
words interchangeably. Compare Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 853
n.10, 464 P.2d 42, 46 n.10, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586, 590 n.10 (1970), with People v.
Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 778, 505 P.2d 537, 542, 106 Cal. Rptr. 112, 118 (1973).
2. See Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494 (Ct. App. 1890). See also C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE 309 (1954); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961). It is important to distinguish between the disclosure of the iden-
tity of an informer and the disclosure of the information in his report. The con-
tents of the communication are not privileged where they do not reveal the iden-
tity of the informer. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957).
3. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957).
4. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1042(d) (West Supp. 1974), amending CAL. Evm.
CODE § 1042 (West 1966), reads:
(d) When in any such criminal proceeding, a party demands dis-
closure of the identity of the informant on the ground the informant is
a material witness in the issue of guilt, the court shall conduct a hearing
at which all parties may present evidence on the issue of disclosure.
Such hearing shall be conducted outside the presence of the jury, if any.
During the hearing, if the privilege provided for in Section 1041 [see
note 16 infra] is claimed by a person authorized to do so or if a person
who is authorized to claim such privilege refuses to answer any question
on the ground that the answer would tend to disclose the identity of the
informant, the prosecuting attorney may request that the court hold an
in camera hearing. If such a request is made, the court shall hold such
a hearing outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel. At the
in camera hearing, the prosecution may offer evidence which would tend
to disclose or which discloses the identity of the informant to aid the
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mony as to information supplied by the unnamed informant is
limited to information establishing probable cause to make an ar-
rest or conduct a search.'
There are two prerequisites to the privilege of nondisclosure:
first, the court must be convinced of the informer's reliability;'
and second, the informer must not be a material witness to the
issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence.7 The requirement of
a "reliable informant" under section 1042(c) is interpreted
broadly inasmuch as the informant need not be proved reliable;
his information need only be corroborated.8  The United States
Supreme Court has defined a "material witness" as a witness who
is "relevant and helpful to the defense or essential to a fair deter-
mination of a cause."9  The California Supreme Court has held
informers to be material witnesses in the following situations: (1)
where the informer participates in the crime; 10 (2) where the in-
court in its determination whether there is a reasonable possibility that
nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial. A reporter
shall be present at the in camera hearing. Any transcriptions of the pro-
ceedings at the in camera hearing, as well as any physical evidence pre-
sented at the hearing, shall be ordered sealed by the court, and only a
court may have access to its contents. The court shall not order disclos-
ure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege,
nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness re-
fuses to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the
evidence presented at the hearing, held in presence of the defendant and
his counsel and the evidence presented at the in camera hearing, the
court concludes that there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure
might deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
5. Thus, the prosecution need not disclose the identity of an informer who
only provides information establishing probable cause. Id. §§ 1042(b), (c) (West
Supp. 1974).
6. Id. § 1042(c).
7. Id. § 1042(d).
8. See People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 629, 634, 440 P.2d 921, 924, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 441, 444 (1968). "Reliable informant" under section 1042(c) must not be
confused with the requirement of reliability under the two-pronged test of Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), for the reliability of an affiant whose affida-
vit leads to the issuance of a search warrant. Both the Johnson test and the Agui-
lar test are used in California, but whereas the former applies to dsclosure of
identity, the latter goes only to the sufficiency of the allegations in a search war-
rant affidavit.
9. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
10. The leading California case on the participant-informer situation is Peo-
ple v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958), where the conviction was
reversed for nondisclosure of the identity of a material witness on the theory that
since the informer bought heroin from the defendant, he could have given evi-
dence relevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence. Tape recordings of tele-
phone conversations, allegedly between the defendant and the informer, concern-
ing the sale of the heroin were played before the jury at trial. The McShann
court noted:
Had there been disclosure, the informer might have testified that no such
telephone call was made, that it was not defendant who received the call,
that someone else called, or that there was an entrapment.
Id. at 810, 330 P.2d at 37. See also People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d 435,
308 P.2d 821 (1957) (heroin purchased from defendant).
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former makes a search warrant affidavit asserting that he has per-
sonal knowledge of the facts of the crime;" (3) where the in-
former was an eyewitness to the crime.'"
When a criminal defendant demands disclosure of the infor-
mant's identity"3 under the material witness exceptions, California
Evidence Code section 1042(d) provides for a two-step deter-
mination of the issue of materiality. The initial "open hearing"
permits the defense to present evidence of materiality. At the
close of this hearing, the prosecutor can compel the court to hold
an in camera hearing from which the defendant and his counsel
are excluded. The prosecutor may offer both testimonial and
physical evidence at this hearing and such evidence and transcrip-
tions will be sealed by the court.
The operation and impact of section 1042(d) in everyday
criminal law practice can be better appreciated by considering a
typical hypothetical situation:1
4
11. In Price v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1970), a search warrant was issued on an affidavit by the informer stating
that he had personal knowledge of the facts. Even though the search was ruled
illegal, the possibility that the informer might have been a material witness re-
quired disclosure. Defendant Price was charged with firing a rifle at a police car.
The informer had stated that on the date of the incident he had observed a conver-
sation, incriminating Price, between persons who had been present at the shooting.
The supreme court held:
[T]he ambiguous statement that the informer overheard a conversation
by persons "known by him" to have been present at the commission of
the crime is sufficient to establish a "possibility" that the informer him-
self was present at the scene of the crime.
Id. at F44, 463 P.2d at 725, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
12. The materiality of an eyewitness-informer is well established. See Hon-
ore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1969)
(informer observed methedrine in defendant's apartment); People v. Perez, 62
Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965) (informer saw marijuana
in the defendant's room); People v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958)
(informer observed sale of drugs to undercover officer); People v. Lynne, 271 Cal.
App. 2d 670, 76 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1969) (informer saw marijuana and heroin in
the defendant's apartment).
In Honore, the crucial issue was whether the defendant had dominion and
control over marijuana found in her apartment. An informer had earlier been
at Honore's home, while she was away, and had observed methedrine there. Since
the informer had also seen four people in the apartment at the time, the supreme
court ruled that he was a material witness, since he might be able to testify
whether any of the four had brought any marijuana into the household themselves.
70 Cal. 2d at 169, 449 P.2d at 173, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
13. Such a demand can be made as part of a pretrial discovery motion or
on cross-examination of a prosecution witness at the preliminary hearing or the
trial. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1042(c), (d) (West Supp. 1974). See Honore v. Su-
perior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1969) (pretrial
discovery motion); People v. Archuleta, 16 Cal. App. 3d 295, 93 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1971) (pretrial discovery motion). If the motion to disclose is made at the time
of trial, the hearing on the motion will be outside the presence of the jury. CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1042(d) (West Supp. 1974).
14. References to this hypothetical will be made throughout the article.
INFORMANT DISCLOSURE
Informer tells Officer that he bought marijuana from Pusher
in a house located at 321 Main Street. Inside the house, Informer
,also saw a white clad woman packaging marijuana. As soon as
a search warrant is issued, Officer enters the house on Main Street
and finds, seated in the living room, Pusher and two women-
Nurse A and Nurse B. Searching in the kitchen, Officer discovers
387 baggies of marijuana. Officer arrests Pusher, Nurse A and
Nurse B for possession of marijuana.
At the preliminary hearing, Officer testifies for the prosecu-
tion. None of the defendants challenges the legality of the search
warrant. However, on cross examination, counsel for Nurse A
asks Officer to disclose the identity of his informer. Officer re-
fuses and asserts the informer privilege. All defendants join in
a motion for disclosure on the ground that the informant is a
material witness. Nurse A asserts that the informer could identify
the "white clad" woman as Nurse B, thereby proving her guilt.
Nurse A states that while Nurse B lived with Pusher, she, Nurse
A, was merely visiting. Surprisingly, Nurse B makes a similar
offer of proof. The prosecutor is in a quandary because only
Pusher's name appears on the mail box of the Main Street house.
When the judge indicates that the nurses have met their burden
of showing a possibility of Informer's materiality, the prosecutor
requests an ex parte, in camera hearing. Accordingly, the prose-
cutor, the judge, the court reporter, and the Officer retire into
chambers for a secret meeting. When they return, the judge
denies the defense motions for disclosure.
The defense, of course, has no way of knowing what evi-
dence was presented in the in camera hearing. Informer himself
might have testified. Physical evidence such as letters addressed
to one of the nurses at the Main Street address might have been
introduced by the prosecution. Neighbors might have been sub-
poenaed to testify about Pusher's roommate. Nevertheless, all
evidence, however exculpatory, has been ordered sealed by the
trial court at the conclusion of the secret hearing.
This article will focus on the procedure for the determination
of the materiality of an informant's testimony as codified in Cali-
fornia Evidence Code section 1042(d). First, section 1042(d)
will be evaluated with particular reference to the interests served
by in camera hearings for informant disclosure, as well as to the
social costs of maintaining such a procedure. Next, the potential
constitutional limitations on section 1042(d) dictated by the fifth
and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution will be
discussed. Finally, an alternative procedure to section 1042(d)
will be suggested and analyzed.
1975]
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THE IN CAMERA HEARING: POLICY AND PERSPECTIVE
Long before -the enactment of section 1042(d), -the identity
of certain informers was protected under rules permitting nondis-
closure."5 The California rule protected the identity of an in-
former when the public interest in nondisclosure outweighed the
interest in disclosure to the individual defendant.' 6 Two theories
supported the privilege. Under the "protection-inhibition"
theory, nondisclosure was deemed necessary to guarantee the
physical safety of the informer, so that fears of reprisal would not
inhibit him from giving information concerning criminal activity.
17
According to the "continual flow" theory, the privilege purport-
edly promoted confidentiality conducive to a continual flow of in-
formation from informers, thereby assuring effective law enforce-
ment.'6
15. For a discussion of the informer privilege at common law, see C. McCoR-
MICK, EVIDENCE 309 (1954); 8 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961).
16. The informer privilege may be invoked under CAL. EVID. CODE § 1041
(West 1966):
(a) Except as provided in this section, a public entity has a privi-
lege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished in-
formation as provided in subdivision (b) purporting to disclose a viola-
tion of a law of the United States or of this state or a public entity in
this state, and to prevent another from disclosing such identity, if the
privilege is claimed by a person authorized by the public entity to do
so and:
(1) Disclosure is forbidden by an act of the Congress of the
United States or a statute of this state; or
(2) Disclosure of the identity of the informer is against the public
interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of
his identity that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of
justice; but no privilege may be claimed under this paragraph if any per-
son authorized to do so has consented that the identity of the informer
be disclosed in the proceeding. In determining whether the disclosure
of the identity of the informer is against the public interest, the interest
of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may
not be considered.
(b) This section applies only if the information is furnished in
confidence by the informer to:
(1) A law enforcement officer;
(2) A representative of an administrative agency charged with th
administration or enforcement of the law alleged to be violated; or
(3) Any person for the purpose of transmittal to a person listed
in paragraph (1) or (2).
(c) There is no privilege under this section to prevent the in-
former from disclosing his identity.
17. See Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administra-
tive Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206, 207 (1953).
18. See United States v. Alvarez, 472 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1973). Note
that the state's interest in protecting the informant may last only as long as the
informant's ability to obtain information. Sometimes, however, future protection
must be guaranteed to an informant to acquire present cooperation. For example,
in order to obtain necessary testimony against the Mafia in the Valachi case, the
FBI bore the burden of protecting Joe Valachi from future reprisals, See P. MAAS,
THE VALACHI PAPERS 48 (1968).
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Invocation of the privilege was once tactically expensive for
the prosecution, for a directed verdict was required on every issue
for which the privileged information was material, and nondis-
closure of a material witness resulted in the dismissal of the entire
case. 19  Prior to 1969, the prosecution could not avoid the di-
rected verdict or the dismissal merely by virtue of its superior
knowledge of the facts concerning materiality. Recognizing that
the prosecution can contact the informer, while the defendant
must attempt factually to support the alleged materiality of an un-
known informer, the California judiciary developed an equitable
allocation of the burden of proof. Under this doctrine, the de-
fense merely had to prove the "possibility" of materiality.20 If
the prosecution, having access to information unavailable to the
defense, could not refute this "possibility," it was required to dis-
close the identity of the informer or drop the charges.
The pre-1969 "disclose or dismiss" rule is memorialized in
People v. Garcia.21 In that case, an affidavit for a search warrant
from two informers stated that three people possessed marijuana,
but neither the affidavit nor the search warrant mentioned the de-
fendant's name. The defendant was present at the apartment
when the police searched it. At the trial, the defendant testified
19. This form of the informer privilege is called "disclose or dismiss." The
first three subsections of section 1042, which were part of the Evidence Code be-
fore the addition of section 1042(d), describe the consequences of invoking the
informer privilege. If the privilege is asserted, section 1042(a) states that an or-
der or finding of fact must be against the state on any issue to which the privi-
leged information is material. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(a) (West Supp. 1974).
The comment to section 1042(a) cautions that the government which prosecutes
the accused also has the duty to see that justice is done. It is clearly unconscion-
able to allow the government to undertake prosecution and then invoke privileges
which deprive the accused of anything which might prove material to his defense.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
There are two exceptions to the general rule of section 1042(a). Section
1042(b) indicates that the identity of an informer is not necessary to prove the
legality of a search made pursuant to a warrant. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1042(b)
(West Supp. 1974). Moreover, when the informer is not a material witness on
the issue of guilt, section 1042(c) declares that his identity is not necessary to
establish reasonable cause to make a search or an arrest. Id. § 1042(c).
A 1969 amendment to the California Evidence Code added the in camera
hearing provision in section 1042(d). Prior to 1969, the issue of materiality was
determined in the open court hearing described in section 1042(c). Although sec-
tion 1042(c) is currently part of the Evidence Code, it must be read in light of
the section 1042(d) exception. Today, a directed verdict is still required on every
issue to which the privileged information is material, but section 1042(d) makes
the proof of materiality extremely difficult for the defendant.
20. See Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr.
233 (1969), where the defendant claimed she was in jail when marijuana was
planted in her apartment. The California Supreme Court held that the defendant
did not need to produce any facts to support her claim: the mere possibility was
sufficient. The supreme court reiterated this doctrine in Price v. Superior Court,
1 Cal. 3d 836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1970).
21. 67 Cal. 2d 830, 434 P.2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967).
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that he had been in the apartment for the first time when arrested.
One month before the trial, the defendant had filed a motion for
pretrial discovery in order to compel disclosure by the People of
the identities of the two informants relied on in the search war-
rant, claiming that they were either participating informants or
material witnesses. The informer privilege was claimed by the
People and disclosure was refused. When, during the trial, the
defense asked for the identity of the two informants on cross-
examination of a police officer, the privilege again was claimed
and disclosure once again refused. On appeal, the California Su-
preme Court held that, "where it appears from the evidence that
the informer was a material witness on the issue of guilt and the
accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination, the People must
either disclose or incur a dismissal. ' 22  The court further held that
it is sufficient for the defense to show that the informer might
be a material witness. 23
The drafters of section 1042(d) felt that the informer privi-
lege in the "disclose or dismiss" form failed to protect police
informers in cases where the district attorney chose to disclose the
identity of the informer rather than incur a dismissal.24 While
California law traditionally resolved the issue of materiality on evi-
dence presented by both the prosecution and the defense at an
open hearing, section 1042(d) allows the prosecutor, on request,
to obtain a second hearing in camera, from which the accused and
his counsel are excluded. Thus, section 1042(d) provides that
a showing of the "mere possibility" that the informer may be
material can be refuted by the district attorney in camera; before
the enactment of section 1042(d), this same showing would have
forced the prosecution either to disclose the identity of the in-
former or to drop the charges.2"
Proponents of the in camera hearing believe it provides the
trial judge with a better understanding of the factual circum-
22. Id. at 836, 434 P.2d at 70, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 114, quoting People v. Mc-
Shann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 808, 330 P.2d 33, 36 (1958).
23. 67 Cal. 2d at 840, 434 P.2d at 372, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 116, quoting People
v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 659, 315 P.2d 79, 82 (1957).
24. In a press release dated August 11, 1969, State Senator Lewis F. Sherman
of Alameda County, a proponent of in camera hearings for informant disclosure,
stated:
Under present law, based upon a tip, the police officer makes an
independent investigation, obtains a search warrant, finds the contra-
band, and testifies in court. At this point the defense counsel may de-
mand the identity of the informer and the district attorney must decide
between a dismissed case and a "liquidated" informer. Most district at-
torneys will not jeopardize their informer. . ..
Copy of release on file with the author.
25. Price v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal. Rptr. 369




stances surrounding the question of materiality.26 These facts are
deemed necessary to enable the judge to balance the defendant's
interest in a fair trial against law enforcement's interest in nondis-
closure. These advocates argue that without the closed hearings,
the determination of materiality becomes merely a "judicial guess-
ing game. '27,
The ex parte procedure described in section 1042(d) was
selected without due consideration of two other alternatives. The
Legislature could have provided for a bilateral in camera hearing
to be attended by defense counsel but not the defendant. The
legislators also could have chosen to leave the existing law un-
changed, for despite its shortcomings, the former rule of "disclose
or dismiss" preserved the defendant's right to a fair trial.28 Too
little attention was given to the fact that under the Anglo-Ameri-
can legal system, the substantive rights necessary to insure a fair
trial include the presumption of innocence,29 the right to confront
one's accusers, 30 and the right of access to whatever information
may be helpful to one's defense." It is the author's contention
that the in camera hearing in any form significantly erodes the
foundations of a fair trial; a fortiori, the exclusion of defense coun-
sel from such a hearing is irreconcilable with existing constitu-
tional authority. Even though the state has a legitimate interest
in the protection of informers, this interest can be satisfied by an
26. See PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 510(c) (3) (Mar. 1971) (this section not adopted).
27. In a concurring opinion to United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464, 470 (3d
Cir. 1967), Justice McLaughlin approved of the trial judge's use of the in camera
proceduie and observed that the judge really cannot perform his function without
being told the identity of and other facts about the informer. The same observa-
tion was made in United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1967).
See also United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1968), where the
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court with the instruction that
the district judge hold an in camera hearing for the purpose of determining
whether disclosure of the informer's identity would have been relevant and help-
ful to the defendant in conducting her defense, and whether the informer was
available as a witness.
28. See United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464, 468 (3rd Cir. 1967), where the
court stated:
No simple answer has yet been found to the informer dilemma which
still continues to vex our courts. Surely the right of the accused to a
fundamentally fair trial is diminished when he is refused access to an
informer, where there is no assurance given to the cout that the infor-
mation possessed by the informer can in no way assist the defense. Set
over against the accused's interest is the necessary reliance placed by law
enforcement agencies, especially in narcotics cases, on the use of in-
formers in securing inroads into areas of illegal activity that would be
otherwise foreclosed without the use of special employees.
29. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096 (West 1970).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In a criminal prosecution, the accused shall en-joy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
31. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
1975]
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open determination of materiality without resorting to the in
camera hearing.
THE RIGHT TO AN ADVOCATE: A LIMIT ON THE
Ex PARTE HEARING
Attractive as the ex parte hearing may seem to law enforce-
ment, it places heavy burdens upon the defendant and the trial
judge.. 2  In addition, the ex parte nature of the in camera hearing
represents a direct conflict with the notions underlying the adver-
sary system of criminal justice.3
The Defendant
The fact that section 1042(d) requires a defendant to argue
a theory of materiality with respect to an unknown informant rep-
resents a nearly insurmountable task. Since the district attorney
can have the informer testify at a closed hearing, the defendant
is often faced with the need to impeach an unidentified witness. 4
Nor can the defendant be assured that the judge will pose the
kinds of questions the defense feels would impeach the informer,
such as whether the informer received compensation for his ser-
vices. 5 Indeed, ex parte or judicial investigation cannot elicit the
32. See text accompanying notes 34-49 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 50-57 infra.
34. For example, a defendant will "need to impeach" the witness who is lying.
If Pusher and the Nurses from the hypothetical (see text accompanying note 14
supra) had been allowed inside the in camera hearing, they could have impeached
untruthful witnesses by: (1) discrediting the witness personally; (2) destroying
all or a portion of the witness' testimony; (3) obtaining some admissions from the
witness and thus weakening the testimony; (4) attacking the credibility of the wit-
ness; (5) developing new facts favorable to the defense; or (6) bringing out the
whole truth-for example, that Nurse A did not live with Pusher. See generally
N. STEVENSON, SUCCESSFUL CROSS EXAMINATION STRATEGY (1971 ).
The defense will also "need to impeach" witnesses who are mistaken, biased
or forgetful. For example, if Informer himself is called to testify, his testimony
regarding his own materiality may be incomplete or inaccurate because of his de-
sire to remain anonymous. Such advocacy is impossible when the witness is un-
identified, for the defense cannot even draft effective written questions to be asked
at the in camera hearing.
35. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 181 (1967); cf. Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
The unreliability of political informers is illustrated by the cases of Louis
Tackwood, Eustacio Martinez and Boyd Douglas. Mr. Tackwood is a 32-year-
old black man who allegedly was employed by the Los Angeles Police Department
for ten years. He worked in the Special Identification and Investigation Section
(SII) and the Criminal Conspiracy Section (CCS). In September, 1971, Tack-
wood confessed his role as an agent provocateur to the Los Angeles Free Press.
See Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17, 1971, section B, at 4.
A 23-year-old Mexican-American named Eustacio Martinez claims to have
infiltrated Casa de Carnalismo, the United Farmworkers Organizing Committee,
the Brown Berets and the Chicano Moratorium Committee, while in the employ
of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (AFT) Division of the Internal Revenue
INFORMANT DISCLOSURE
in-depth examination of credibility accomplished by the adver-
sary proceeding. 36
The secrecy of the in camera hearing extends to its trans-
cripts and records. Both testimonial and physical evidence pre-
sented at the hearing are sealed.3 7  In some cases, the physical
evidence concealed might include tape recordings of conversa-
tions between the informant and the defendant. Prior to the en-
actment of section 1042(d), however, California case law clearly
gave the defendant an unqualified right to the discovery and in-
spection of such recordings or transcripts.38  Thus, section 1042
(d) has the effect of reducing the scope of criminal discovery
available to the defense.
No appellate court has thoroughly examined the burdens
placed upon the defendant by the ex parte, in camera hearing,
and only one court has adequately discussed the bilateral in cam-
era hearing. The recent federal district court decision of United
States v. Lopez39 has been recognized as a seminal case in an area
where no appellate court had ventured. 40  Lopez is noteworthy
for its careful analysis of the bilateral in camera hearing and its
solicitous attitude towards the rights of the criminal defendant.
Service. At a recent Los Angeles press conference, Martinez admitted to several
acts of provocation. See Los Angeles Times, Feb. 1, 1972, section 1, at 1.
Boyd Douglas, a paroled felon, was the government's key witness against
Rev. Phillip Berrigan and his six co-defendants, better known as the "Harrisburg
Seven." This informer's conviction of fraud evidenced past prevarication, in
addition to a desire for leniency. See Radicals: The Informer, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
14, 1972, at 26, and Radicals: The Berrigan Informer, TiME, Feb. 1, 1971, at
20. For an illuminating history of the political informer, see Donnelly, Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J.
1091 (1951).
36. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 181 (1967); Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966).
37. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(d) (West Supp. 1974) states in part:
Any transcription of the proceeding at the in camera hearing, as well
as any physical evidence presented at the hearing, shall be ordered sealed
by the court, and only a court may have access to its contents.
38. Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959); People v.
Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 335 P.2d 114 (1959); see also People v. Estrada, 54 Cal.
2d 713, 355 P.2d 641, 7 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1960); Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.
2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959). The transcript of the informer's testimony may
be highly useful to the defense, both for investigation and impeachment purposes.
Furthermore, the testimony of the informer may include information which would
tend to prove the defendant innocent. To withhold such exculpatory evidence
from the defense would be a denial of due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due pro-
cess where the evidence is material either to guilt or the degree of punishment war-
ranted. Brady involved the suppression of a murder confession by the defendant's
accomplice. Id. at 86-88.
39. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
40. See Comment, Criminal Procedure-Airport Searches-Reasonableness of
Frisk, 39 TENN. L. REV. 354 (1972); Comment, Criminal Procedure-Stop and
Frisk-A Systemhtic Approach, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1173 (1972).
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Defendant Lopez was apprehended at the John F. Kennedy
Airport just as he was about to board a plane for Puerto Rico.
Pursuant to the anti-hijacking profile, an employee of Pan Ameri-
can Airlines had pointed out the defendant and another man as
"selectees" or persons whose physical characteristics and de-
meanor suggested they were potential hijackers. A search of the
defendant produced heroin. The defendant was then charged
with concealing and facilitating the transportation of heroin and
with conspiring to commit that crime.4'
At the trial, the defense moved to suppress the heroin taken
from the defendant on the ground that the use of the profile vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Since it was thought that the effectiveness of the anti-hijacking
profile might be undermined if it were examined in an open court
hearing, an in camera investigation was conducted.
The court in Lopez did not employ the ex parte hearing,
however, but permitted defense counsel to hear all testimony
about the profile and to cross-examine witnesses. The public and
the defendant were excluded from the courtroom. Despite the
presence of defense counsel, the district court was extremely con-
cerned with the effect of this adversary, in camera hearing on the
defendant's right to a public trial and his right to confront adverse
witnesses. The district court stated that the exclusion of the de-
fendant could not be justified as harmless error simply because
his attorney was present.42 Noting that the burden of justifying
the anti-hijacking procedure was substantial, the court neverthe-
less approved the adversary hearing which included defense coun-
sel but not the defendant, on the rationale that disclosure would
hamper law enforcement.43 A hearing with only defense counsel
and the prosecution present was considered the best way to in-
vestigate the profile and, at the same time, protect the rights of
the individual defendant.
Such a bilateral hearing is easier to justify than an ex parte
hearing, from which defense counsel is excluded, but even the
presence of defense counsel does not guarantee protection of the
defendant's rights in informant disclosure proceedings. In com-
paring the nature of the hijacking profile to the informer privilege,
the Lopez court noted that informers may give information fur-
nishing a basis for an arrest without a warrant, whereas the anti-
hijacking profile merely supplies the probable cause to frisk.44 In
41. 21 U.S.C. §§ 173, 174 (1970).
42. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
43. Id. at 1091-92.
44. Viewing the anti-hijacking profile itself as an "objective" system which
acts as an informer, the Lopez court compared the system to the traditional "sub-
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other words, the anti-hijacking profile is relevant only to the issue
of probable cause, while the informer privilege affects the more
fundamental issue of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, the dis-
closure of the anti-hijacking profile would adversely affect the
prevention of hijackings on a nationwide scale, while the publica-
tion of an informant's name would, at the very worst, facilitate
a limited number of crimes. In view of the critical nature of the
informer privilege, the exclusion of defense counsel from the sec-
tion 1042(d) hearing is clearly inconsistent with the rejection of
the ex parte procedure in Lopez.
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence avoid unfairness to
the accused by authorizing a bilateral in camera hearing on in-
formant disclosure. Rule 510(c)(3) would require attendance by
both counsel if the judge does not believe the informer is reason-
ably reliable, or if his information is used to establish the legality
of a means of obtaining evidence. 45  This procedure is designed
to avoid "any significant impairment of secrecy, while affording
the accused a substantial measure of protection against arbitrary
police action."46  In light of the modern preference for adversary
in camera hearings, California's ex parte hearing on informant dis-
closure is clearly antiquated.
The Judge
The ex parte hearing burdens trial judges as well as de-
fendants. Without the aid of a defense advocate, the trial judge
must assess the credibility of the informer, critically examine the
prosecutor's theory of immateriality, object to leading questions,
and move to strike irrelevant or inadmissible answers. At the
same time, the judge must try to keep an open mind and attempt
impartially to determine the factual issues. Indeed, dicta in one
recent United States Supreme Court case suggests that a bilateral
hearing is necessary to avoid burdening the trial judge with the
additional duties of an adversary. In Dennis v. United States,47
jective informer":
In fact, the instant case actually presents a stronger case for non-
disclosure to the defendant because the informant is an objective system,
not an individual who might be known to the defendant. He could not,
by his presence, hope to impugn its credibility. Furthermore, since the
level of probability required to justify a frisk is lower than "probable
cause" there is a corresponding lower necessity for disclosure.
Id. at 1092.
45. PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES rule 510(c)(3) (Mar. 1971) (this section not adopted). The
Proposed Rules have since been approved by Congress as the FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE. Public Law 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
46. Id., Commentary at p. 61.
47. 384 U.S. 855 (1966). The defendants in Dennis had been convicted of
conspiring fraudulently to obtain the services of the N.L.R.B. for their labor
union, by filing false affidavits forswearing their communist affiliations.
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the Supreme Court unanimously held that the failure of the trial
court to permit the defendants to examine witnesses' grand jury
testimony constituted reversible error. Regarding the discovery
of grand jury transcripts, the Supreme Court stated that "trial
judges ought not to be burdened with the task or the responsibility
of examining sometimes voluminous grand jury testimony in order
to ascertain inconsistencies with trial testimony. "48 The Court
further stated that "[f]n our adversary system, it is enough for
judges to judge. The determination of what may be useful to the
defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advo-
cate."49
Adversary Hearings and the "Complex Task" Doctrine
The necessity of the adversary hearing was again suggested
by the Supreme Court in Alderman v. United States,50 which was
a consolidation of cases involving electronic surveillance by the
government. One case involved defendants Alderman and Al-
derisio, who were convicted of conspiring to transmit to the Soviet
Union information relating to the national defense of the United
States. In Alderman, the government was required to disclose
all of the information obtained from its surveillance that would
be "arguably relevant" to the convictions. 5' The Supreme Court
rejected the suggestion that records of the conversation first be
submitted to the trial judge for an in camera examination. In re-
fusing the government's request for an in camera hearing, the
Court stated that the task of winnowing out prohibited evidence
belonged to an advocate.52  The in camera decision of the trial
judge alone was deemed insufficient to effect properly so complex
a determination.
While it can be argued that the Alderman rationale requires
an adversary proceeding for the resolution of all issues raised by
a criminal proceeding, the United States Supreme Court has ex-
48. Id. at 874.
49. Id. at 875.
50. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
51. Id. at 184.
52. Id. at 182. As the court explained:
An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what
appears to be a neutral person or event, the identity of a caller of the
individual on the other end of a telephone, or even the manner of speak-
ing or using words may have special significance to one who knows the
more intimate facts of an accused's life. And yet that information may
be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted
with all relevant circumstances. Unavoidably, this is a matter of judg-
ment, but in our view the task is too complex, and the margin for error
too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court




pressly rejected this view in Taglianetti v. United States,53 a case
involving a prosecution for the willful attempt to evade income
taxes. The district court in Taglianetti had conducted an ex parte
in camera examination of government records of electronic sur-
veillance to determine whether the government had correctly
identified the defendant's voice. The Supreme Court approved
the in camera procedure, noting that the contested voice identi-
fication in surveillance tapes failed the "complex task" or the
"high margin for error" requirement of Alderman. 4
In in camera hearings on informant disclosure the necessity
of assessing witness credibility, evaluating the prosecution's case,
and observing the rules of evidence combine to make the deter-
mination of ,the materiality of an informer's identity a task which
is sufficiently complex to involve the high margin for error dis-
cussed in Alderman and Taglianetti. Clearly, questions regard-
ing the, materiality of such testimony are far more complex than
the mere identification of an accused's voice on surveillance tapes.
Furthermore, just as the grand jury transcripts considered in
Dennis were voluminous and full of inconsistencies, the informer,
as a live witness, possesses a wealth of information, which a skilled
defense attorney could probe for inconsistencies. Reasonable
men and women may differ as to the credibility of a witness.
Therefore, a judge should not be burdened with the subjective
assessment of credibility absent the aid of a defense advocate.
The use of hearings in which advocates represent partisan
interests before impartial judges is a basic aspect of our system
of criminal justice,55 because such hearings provide for accurate
resolutions of factual issues while guarding against error caused
by the judges' relative unfamiliarity with the cases before them. 6
53. 394 U.S. 316 (1969).
54. Id. at 317-18. The court stated:
Nothing in Alderman v. United States, Ivanov v. United States, or
Butenko v. United States [citations omitted], requires an adversary pro-
ceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue raised by an elec-
tronic surveillance. On the contrary, an adversary proceeding and dis-
closure were required in those cases, not for lack of confidence in the
integrity of government counsel or the trial judge, but only because the
in camera procedures at issue there would have been an inadequate
means to safeguard a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Here the
defendant was entitled to see a transcript of his own conversations and
nothing else. He had no right to rummage in government files. The
trial court was asked to identify those instances of surveillance which
petitioner bad standing to challenge under the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule and to double-check the accuracy of the Government's voice
identifications. Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot hold
that "the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great to rely
wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court." Alderman v.
United States [citation omitted].
Id.
55. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80 (1950).
56. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969). See also Carroll
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Thus, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, adopted by the Conference
of California Judges recognize that ex parte hearings are an ex-
treme measure and therefore caution against them. 7 Essentially,
then, the major defect in the section 1042(d) procedure lies in
its exclusion of defense counsel from the crucial determination of
the materiality of the informant. Whether this exclusion also vio-
lates the defendant's constitutional rights will be explored in the
following section.
UNDOING LEGISLATIVE ExCESS: THE ROLE
OF THE JUDICIARY
The interests of law enforcement often are invoked to justify
the heavy burden upon the accused, the limits on discovery, and
the exclusion of defense counsel from the in camera hearing on
informant disclosure. Unless prodded by judicial and public
opinion, the California Legislature is not likely to revise section
1042(d). Hopefully, an enlightened judiciary will attempt to
limit the excesses of section 1042(d) by utilizing such explicit
constitutional guarantees as the right of confrontation, the right
to compulsory process, the right to a public trial, the right to a
jury trial, and the right to counsel."8 Since section 1042(d) ar-
v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968), where the
court stated:
The value of a judicial proceeding, as against self-help by the police,
is substantially diluted where the process is ex parte, because the Court
does not have available the fundamental instrument for judicial judg-
ment: an adversary proceeding in which both parties may participate.
57. The disfavor in which the ex parte hearing is placed by the Canons is
worth noting:
14-EX PARTE APPLICATIONS
A judge should act upon ex parte applications for injunctions and other
extraordinary remedies only after careful consideration and where the
necessity for quick action is clearly shown. He should grant relief only
when fully satisfied that the law permits the relief sought and that the
urgency of the particular situation demands it.
15-EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
A judge should not permt private interviews, arguments or communi-
cations designed to influence his judicial action, where interests to be
affected thereby are not represented before him, except in cases where
provision is made by law for ex parte application ...
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Nos. 14 & 15, CAL. RULES OF COURT, App. Div. II
(West Supp. 1974).
58. Both the federal and state constitutions declare that the accused shall have
the basic rights of confrontation, compulsory process, public trial, jury trial and
counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the Witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
CAL. CONsT., art. 1, § 13 provides, in part:
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guably violates each one of these constitutionally guaranteed
rights, it deserves serious judicial assessment.
Right of Confrontation
The California Supreme Court has never considered the con-
stitutionality of section 1042(d) with regard to the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation. 59 The applicability of the right to
confront"0 witnesses at a section 1042(d) hearing depends on
whether the informer falls within the class of "witnesses against"
who are subject to the confrontation guarantee."' Two interpre-
tations of the "witnesses against" requirement are possible. The
phrase can refer either to one who gives testimonial evidence
against the accused, or one who is a material witness. 2 If the
In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused
shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of
the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to ap-
pear and defend, in person and with counsel ...
Under both the state and federal versions of these rights, the first level of
inquiry should be whether the section 1042(d) hearing is the type of proceeding
to which the enumerated rights of the accused ought to apply. Since both the
sixth amendment and the state constitution are limited to "criminal prosecutions,"
there are no special rights in non-criminal proceedings.
The case of United States v. Dali, 424 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 821 (1971), suggests that the sixth amendment should apply to
suppression hearings. Clearly, the section 1042(d) hearing should merit the same
constitutional protection as a hearing for the suppression of evidence, since the
question of an informer's identity affects the more fundamental issue of guilt or
innocence, while physical evidence goes to the less important issue of probable
cause to search.
59. This is not surprising in view of the courts' lack of concern for the con-
frontation clause generally. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and Rules
of Evidence: Sir Walter Raleigh Rides Again, 9 ALAS. L.J. 3 (1971), which notes
that the right of confrontation has received scant attention from courts and com-
mentators.
The United States Supreme Court held confrontation to be a fundamental
right, and therefore applicable to state criminal trials through the fourteenth
amendment, in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Even if the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation does not apply to section 1042(d) in camera hearings,
the due process clause of the fifth amendment may require a right of confronta-
tion. See In re Gault, 287 U.S. 1 (1967). However, while the due process right
of confrontation may be of broader applicability than the sixth amendment grant,
it may require less rigorous standards for its satisfaction, since it is an implied
rather than express right.
60. This analysis evolved from a series of discussions with UCLA Law Pro-
fessor Kenneth Graham, and I gratefully acknowledge his assistance. For a more
complete treatment of confrontation see Graham, The Right of Confrontation and
Rules of Evidence: Sir Walter Raleigh Rides Again, 9 ALAS. L.J. 3 (1971);
Graham, The Right of Confrontation and Rules of Evidence: The Return of the
Portuguese Gentleman, 9 ALAS. L.J. 3 (May 1971); Graham, The Right of
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8
CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972).
61. "[Tjhe accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
Witnesses against him ....... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
62. If the "material witness" test is adopted, the informer is a "witness
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prosecutor brings the informer into the in camera hearing, it is
clear that the informer is a "witness against" the defendant under
both definitions. If, however, the informer fails to give testi-
monial evidence, he may be a "witness against" under the second
definition, but clearly not under the first.
Bolstering the argument that the non-testifying informer is
a "witness against" under the material witness definition is the
rule excepting material witnesses from the informer privilege.63
Like any other exception to a privilege, the material witness ex-
ception is an implied recognition of the dictates of the confronta-
tion clause.64
In addition to the uncertain "witnesses against" doctrine,
there are other approaches to the scope of confrontation. Read
literally the confrontation clause would require testimonial evi-
dence to be presented solely through witnesses present in court. 65
Because such an interpretation would exclude all hearsay evi-
dence,6 a much narrower interpretation traditionally has been ap-
plied: the right to confrontation was equated with the right to
cross-examine witnesses.67  In 1895, the United States Supreme
Court stated that the primary object of the confrontation clause
was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits from being used
against" a defendant on the issue of his own materiality regardless of whether
he actually testifies in camera. At issue in the section 1042(d) hearing is the
materiality of the unidentified informer, who in turn is a material witness on this
issue.
Even if the narrower test of "testimonial evidence" is adopted, such testimony
need not be limited to in-court statements. A sworn affidavit may be testimony
as well. The confrontation clause, however, does not apply to statements which
are signed but not sworn, since these do not constitute "testimony."
63. Roviero v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
64. It is well settled that the privilege, as applied to non-material witnesses,
does not violate the right of confrontation. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967). A study of the informer's privilege with particular attention to the intent
of the Constitutional Convention is very useful in applying the confrontation
clause to the section 1042(d) proceeding. There are documents written before
the Constitution which provide the right to confront "accusers." See VA. CONST.
§ 8 (1776), which provides: "In all capital and criminal cases a man hath a right
to ...be confronted with the accusers and witnesses." Two interpretations are
thus possible. Either the common law right of confrontation was applied against
witnesses and informers, or the omission of the word "accusers" in the United
States Constitution signifies an intent to limit the right to confront witnesses. At
any rate, the contention that the informer privilege does not violate the right of
confrontation needs to be reexamined in view of these pre-constitutional docu-
ments.
65. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 561 (1936) defines "con-
front" as "to put or bring face to face, to cause to face or meet."
66. Hearsay evidence consists of out of court statements offered for the truth
of the matter asserted. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1200 (West 1966). If testimonial
evidence must be presented through in-court witnesses, then all hearsay evidence
would be excluded. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (1940).
67. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1395-97 (1940).
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against the defendant in lieu of a personal cross-examination of
the witness.68 Thereafter, a line of cases equated the confronta-
tion clause with the right of cross-examination,"9 until the Su-
preme Court's holding in Dutton v. Evans0 distinguished the two
rights. If the right of confrontation is no longer synonymous with
the right to cross-examine, confrontation may merely mean the
right to prepare a defense.7 1
It is also unclear whether the right to confrontation attaches
to the defendant personally or can be satisfied by in camera cross-
examination by defense counsel. Those courts which follow the
former view -are concerned with the heavy burden of justifying the
in camera procedure, even where it is bilateral in nature. Thus,
United States v. Lopez, contains dicta to the effect that the mere
presence of a defense attorney does not guarantee compliance
68. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). The Court went
on to uphold the hearsay exception for prior recorded testimony, the confronta-
tion clause notwithstanding.
69. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965).
70. 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). The Supreme Court affirmed a Georgia murder
conviction where a prosecution witness was allowed to relate admissions made by
the defendant's co-conspirator. Four of the justices (Stewart, White, Blackmun
and Burger) joined in an opinion which apparently distinguished the right of con-
frontation from the right of cross-examination. The dissenters (Marshall, Black,
Douglas, and Brennan) asserted that cross-examination and the opportunity for
the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness are two elements of the confronta-
tion clause. Id. at 101. For a cursory history of the confrontation clause from
Mattox to Dutton as well as a discussion of the proposition that Dutton divorced
cross-examination from confrontation, see Griswold, The Due Process Revolution
and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1971).
However, the Griswold thesis may have been shattered by the high Court's
holding that a defendant was denied his right to confrontation when the trial court
refused to allow cross-examination of a key government witness. See Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). Note, however, the concurring opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, in which he stated that cross-examination was constitutionally re-
quired only under the peculiar facts of the Davis case:
In joining the Court's opinion, I would emphasize that the Court neither
holds nor suggests that the Constitution confers a right in every case to
impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross-examination
about his past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions.
Id. at 321.
71. Dictum in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967), suggests
that confrontation is an aspect of the right to prepare a defense:
In contrast, today's law enforcement machinery involves critical confron-
tations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where
the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself
to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal
prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee
to apply to "critical" stages of the proceedings. The guarantee reads:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." (Emphasis supplied.)
The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel's assist-
ance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful "defense."
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with the confrontation clause.7" Indeed, effective advocacy may
depend on the assistance of the defendant, who often is more
familiar with the facts than his counsel.
By the same token, the jurisdictions which allow confronta-
tion to be satisfied vicariously emphasize the interchangeability of
the defendant and his attorney. A typical case is Ellis v. Okla-
homa, where the right of confrontation was held inapplicable to a
bilateral in camera hearing on a juror's qualifications, on the
theory that the criminal defendant lacks an absolute right under
the confrontation clause to be a participant. 73  Yet, despite the
position in Ellis and other similar cases, 74 vicarious confrontation
may be inapplicable to a section 1042(d) situation. Unlike the
examination of veniremen, a matter for which the defendant can
be of little value to his attorney, an attorney's examination of an
informer might require quick, continuous access to his client for
effective cross-examination.
On the other hand, even if the section 1042(d) hearing is
technically violative of the confrontation clause, the government's
interest in effective law enforcement may be so important as to
require an involuntary waiver of the right to confrontation.75 A
defendant may involuntarily waive confrontation if he is a member
of a class of individuals to whom confrontation has been denied,
because there are circumstances where the national security inter-
est justifies infringing the otherwise fully assured right of a person
to be confronted by his accusers. 76  Thus, the existence of an in-
72. 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The court declared:
But any defendant, if he is found guilty, should, as a matter of funda-
mental fairness and as part of the rehabilitative process, have the assur-
ance, by reason of his direct observation, that justice was done.
Id.
73. 430 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1970).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1971); Near
v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963).
75. The right of confrontation is not absolute. It may be waived by the de-
fendant's statements or his acts. The United States Supreme Court recently held,
in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), that the trial judge may exclude the
defendant when necessary to preserve order and decorum in the courtroom. That
proposition has been subject to considerable criticism. See Helwig, Coping with
the Unruly Defendant, 7 GONZAGA L. REV. 17 (1971); Comment, Courtroom Re-
straint of the Criminal Defendant, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 141 (1973); Note, The
Disruptive Criminal Defendant, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 307 (1970). The American
Bar Association recommends that the defendant be allowed to observe the court
proceedings through methods of modem technology. ABA STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN DEALING WITH TRIAL DISRUPTIONS, part C.1 (Approved
Draft 1972).
While the case of the disruptive defendant may be deemed a voluntary waiver
of the right to confrontation, the protective policy considerations underlying the
informer privilege may necessarily imply an involuntary waiver of the right of
confrontation in the section 1042(d) hearing.
76. See McKay, The Right of Confrontation, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 122. Mc-
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voluntary waiver in the section 1042(d) situation depends on
whether society's interest in the informer privilege is sufficiently
important to outweigh the defendant's interest in having the in-
former's identity disclosed.
Whatever the nuances of the confrontation clause, its pur-
pose is to guarantee the accused direct access to his accusers.
The section 1042(d) proceeding serves to shield a potentially in-
valuable witness from the defense on the ground that the informer
would not be useful to the defendant. By doing so, section 1042
(d) limits the defendant's access to a person who was instrumental
to his indictment.
Right to Compulsory Process
The criminal defendant's right to compulsory process to ob-
tain witnesses is of recent origin; at common law, the right was
possessed by the prosecution alone .7  The Bill of Rights cor-
rected this defect by giving the subpoena power to the accused. 78
Thus, the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. .... ,,79
The applicability of this right to the defendant's section 1042
(d) hearing depends on whether the testimony given at the hear-
ing is by a "witness in his favor." The defense counsel and de-
fendant must determine which witnesses are to be subpoenaed for
the defense, since selection of defense witnesses is not left
to the prosecutor."' Even though most informers would advocate
their own immateriality at the in camera hearing, the defendant
should be the one to decide if the informer is a "witness in his
favor" on the issue of identity disclosure. The defendant could
argue that the informer must either be a witness against him or
a witness in his favor, thereby invoking either the right of confron-
tation or the right to compulsory process.
That all individuals are subject to compulsory process was de-
cided in United States v. Cooper."' There, defendant Cooper was
charged with libel on the President of the United States.
Kay classifies the principal groups of people to whom confrontation has been held
dispensable, because of the asserted requirements of national security, as the fol-
lowing: government employees, employees of contractors of the government, mar-
itime workers, international agencies, military personnel, aliens, conscientious ob-
jectors and applicants for passports. Id. at 132-42.
77. The common law right to compulsory process was possessed by both par-
ties in civil cases. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2191 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
78. See State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1326 (West 1970).
81. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 341 (1800).
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Cooper's application to the Supreme Court "requesting" the at-
tendance of several members of Congress was refused by Justice
Chase, since it was deemed unnecessary to request the attendance
of witnesses when the Constitution gave the defendant the right
to order their appearancea 2
Despite the deference usually accorded the right to compul-
sory process, the defense will have to overcome the California
case of People v. Pacheco,88 which summarily upheld the section
1042(d) in camera hearing against the contention that it violated
the right to compulsory process. The court in Pacheco noted that
the record of the in camera hearing showed that knowledge of
the informer's identity could not have benefited the defendant.84
Perhaps Pacheco's inadequate treatment of the right to compul-
sory process can also be explained by the fact that the ex parte
determination of the informer's non-materiality keeps the in-
former's name from the defendant. Because there is no right to
subpoena an unknown bystander, the defendant may not use the
subpoena as a fishing expedition to discover the identity of the
informer. Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a duty to disclose all
evidence favorable and material to the defense."5 An informer
who can give material evidence on the issue of materiality, there-
fore, should be "disclosed" by the prosecution and subpoenaed
by the court.8s
At the root of Pacheco's questionable ruling is the court's
failure to distinguish the informer privilege from the procedure
used to determine the materiality of an informer.8 7  The court
of appeal contended that it was the
82. Id.
83. 27 Cal. App. 3d 70, 103 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1972).
84. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 80, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 589. This summary decision
by the court of appeal may have denied the defendant the right to an appellate
advocate. The policy underlying the right to an appeal requires that the appellate
counsel be given the opportunity to obtain the full transcript and advocate reversal
based on that record. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 3.3 (1970). In Pacheco, the appel-
late court read the transcript and ruled the evidence immaterial, thereby denying
the defendant the same rights violated initially by the trial court in the in camera
hearing. The reviewing court additionally infringed upon the right to appeal.
85. See Comment, Suppression: The Prosecution's Failure to Disclose Evi-
dence Favorable to the Defense, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 348 (1973); Comment, Duty
of the Prosecutor to Call Witnesses Whose Testimony Will Help the Accused to
Establish his Innocence, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 68; Note, The Prosecutor's Constitu-
tional Duty to Reveal Evidence to The Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
86. Again, in the hypothetical (see text accompanying note 14 supra), In-
former is not a material witness to the guilt or innocence of Pusher; nevertheless
he is material to the issue of his own materiality. Pusher can argue that his right
to compulsory process requires that he be allowed to subpoena Informer on the
issue of disclosure. Query whether Pusher should have the right to subpoena ev-
eryone he knows and ask if they informed on him.
87. Again, the reader must not confuse the two issues: the informer privilege
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invocation of the basic privilege that denies informer's name
to the defendant, not the in camera hearing, which is only the
method by which the court determines the applicability of the
privilege. If the sixth amendment were to apply, it would
deny the privilege, the right to which has been determined to
be valid.88
In fact, the privilege theoretically only denies to the defendant
the names of non-material informants of no value to him. The
ex parte, in camera hearing, on the other hand, is the procedure
by which the court can erroneously determine that a material in-
former is non-material. The absence of defense counsel, of
course, increases the likelihood of this unfortunate result.
The Pacheco court's confusion over privilege and procedure
explains why it failed to consider the right to have depositions as
a solution to the compulsory process dilemma. 9 Both the right
to compulsory process and the informer's need for anonymity
could be satisfied by allowing defense counsel to attend the in
camera hearing, or by a system of written interrogatories, or by
having the defense file voir dire questions with the judge to be
asked of the informer. The court of appeal never considered
these alternatives. Due to these unresolved issues in Pacheco, its
terse approval of section 1042(d) is less than persuasive.
Right to Public Trial
The right to a public trial is another constitutional guarantee
which arguably overrides the governmental interest in nondis-
closure of informers' identities. Traditionally viewed as a guaran-
tee against the use of courts as instruments of persecution,"0 pub-
lic trial has been highly regarded by the United States Supreme
Court:
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has
been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice
by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English
Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse
of the lettre de cachet. All of these institutions obviously
symbolized a menace to liberty.9 '
and the procedure to determine the applicability of that privilege. The informer
privilege protects the identity of the informer if he is not deemed a material wit-
ness. Whether the privilege will apply is determined in part in the ex parte, in
camera hearing.
88. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 82, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
89. Wigmore notes that many jurisdictions fail to observe the right to have
depositions taken which should be deemed included in the constitutional grant. 8
J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 2191 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
90. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); United States v. Kobil, 172 F.2d
919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949). See generally F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
(1951).
91. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948).
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The right to a public trial is expressly granted by the sixth amend-
ment, which provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial. .. .
Among the reasons that have been advanced in favor of
public trials are the following: (1) some member of the public
may come forward to aid the defendant; 93 (2) a public hearing
avoids the suspicion which always accompanies secrecy;94 (3)
knowledge that the hearing is subject to contemporaneous review
by the public is an effective restraint on the prosecutor and the
judge; 5 (4) a public hearing enables spectators to observe the
procedures followed by their government and to acquire confi-
dence in judicial remedies;"' and (5) the defendant should, at
minimum, be entitled to the presence of family and friends re-
gardless of the charges.9 7  Many of these rationales also apply to
in camera proceedings.
Despite the right to a public trial, it is within the discretion
of the trial court to exclude some or all of the spectators from
the courtroom. The Supreme Court has reversed convictions aris-
ing from trials that were too public"s as well as from trials that
were completely secret. 9 An order that certain spectators be ex-
cluded from the courtroom has been viewed as a proper exercise
of discretion when the subject matter of a case was sexually ex-
plicit, 10° when the order benefited the accused'01 or a witness,
10 2
92. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right was made applicable to state court
proceedings through the fourteenth amendment in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948). In addition, denial of a public trial may deprive the accused in a crimi-
nal trial of the fairness required by the federal Constitution's guarantee of due
process. The right is also guaranteed in the California Constitution. CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 13.
93. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 & n.24 (1948). See also United States
v. Kobil, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58,
59 (9th Cir. 1944).
94. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948). See also United States v. Con-
solidated Laundries Corp., 266 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1959).
95. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). See also United States v. Kobil,
172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); Davis v. United States, 247 F.2d 394, 395 (8th
Cir. 1917).
96. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 & n.24 (1948). See also United States
v. Kobil, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Consolidated Laun-
dries Corp., 266 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1959).
97. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 (1948). See also United States v. Brown,
7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 CMR 41 (1956).
98. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965).
99. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
100. Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
842 (1959); United States v. Kobil, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949).
101. See United States v. Zimmerman, 19 CMR 806, 814 (1954).
102. Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
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or when it was designed to prevent courtroom disturbances or
overcrowding.010 The exclusion of the public from the section
1042(d) hearing, however, is another matter. The section 1042
(d) in camera proceeding does not involve the exercise of judicial
discretion, as it is held on the demand of the prosecutor. The
power to exclude members of the public is properly within the
discretion of an independent magistrate;' but it should not be
within the discretion of the prosecutor, who is an advocate for
nondisclosure of the informant's identity and who is unconcerned
with impartially balancing the defendant's right to a public trial
against the interest in secrecy. 0 5
842 (1959); United States v. Kobil, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949); Reagan
v. United States, 202 F. 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1913).
103. United States v. Kobil, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949); United States
v. Zimmerman, 19 CMR 806, 814 (1954); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488,
489 (9th Cir. 1913).
104. Even here it can only be granted to deal with an embarrassing subject,
courtroom disturbance, overcrowding, or to protect the defendant or a witness.
See text accompanying notes 100-03 supra.
105. If there is a right to a public section 1042(d) hearing, it is unclear
whether that right would require that the hearing be open solely to the accused
or to the public as well. The large number of cases which hold that the defend-
ant's right to a public trial may be waived by his failure to assert it seem to sup-
port the view that the right belongs exclusively to the defendant. See Geise v.
United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Sorsentino, 175
F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Kobil, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS rule 3.5(d) (Approved
Draft 1968) allows exclusion of the general public and the news media from por-
tions of a trial occurring outside the presence of the jury, on motion by the de-
fendant.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IX states:
The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Although no court has discussed the ninth amendment as a basis for granting the
public an independent right to be present at trials, some cases have held that such
a right exists on other grounds. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d
745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956) (defendant's waiver of a public trial due to embarrass-
ing testimony does not justify exclusion of the general public); E.W. Scripps Co.
v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed per curiam, 164
Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955) (defendant's waiver of public trial had no
effect because of public's independent right to attend). See generally Comment,
Exclusion of the General Public From a Criminal Trial-Some Problem Areas,
1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 458.
The problem of the public's independent right to be present generally arises
in the context of excessive or prejudicial pretrial publicity. See ABA, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS (Approved Draft 1968). But the interests
of a fair trial and a free press are not necessarily opposed in the section 1042
(d) hearing. In this proceeding the issue is merely the scope of the right to a
public trial. In the interests of informer protection, "public trial" might narrowly
be defined to require the exclusion of the general public and the media. On the
other hand, the fundamental philosophy of a democratic society might require an
open hearing so that all citizens will be able intelligently to participate in the
processes of their government.
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Right To Jury Trial
Trial by jury has been -traced to the Magna Carta.1°6 The
First Continental Congress declared trial by jury as "the inherent
and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.' 0 7
This high regard for the jury trial in criminal cases resulted in
a double guarantee by the Federal Constitution.108 The right
does not extend, however, to "petty offenses."' 0°  Thus, those in
camera hearings which arise in conjunction with a criminal pro-
ceeding involving a petty offense encompass no right to a jury
trial, while those which arise from felony or serious misdemeanor
offenses arguably do.
Even if the underlying trial warrants a jury, not all the issues
presented at the in camera hearing merit jury resolution. It is
clearly -the law in California that where the trial is by jury, the
jury alone is to decide all questions of fact. 10 Since section 1042
(d) provides that the judge shall hold an in camera hearing at
the request of the prosecutor, the trial judge might be forced to
decide factual issues normally tried to the jury.
Entrapment furnishes a good example. If a defendant
moves for the disclosure of the identity of an informer on the
theory that the informer planted narcotics in the defendant's
home, -the prosecutor can require the judge to hold an in camera
hearing, where the informer can testify that he did not entrap the
defendant. Entrapment is an issue which is traditionally tried by
the jury,"' and whenever there is sufficient evidence of entrap-
ment, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on it. 1 2  Despite
the clear authority for entrapment to be tried by the jury, section
106. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 349 (T.
Cooley ed. 1893). Some historians, however, reject this claim. See Frankfurter,
Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HAv. L. REv. 917, 922 (1926).
107. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 270 (R. Perry ed. 1959).
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he trial of
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury ....... The sixth
amendment provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the Crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
109. Frankfurter, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of
Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 925-28 (1926). See also Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (if a prosecution involves an offense punishable by
more than six months imprisonment, the defendant has a right to a jury trial);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
110. CAL. EvID. CODE § 312(a) (West 1966); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1126 (West
1970).
111. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); People v. West, 139 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 923, 927,
293 P.2d 166, 167 (Super. Ct. 1956). See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963); People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).
112. People v. Gallagher, 107 Cal. App. 425, 428, 290 P. 504, 505 (1930).
LVol. 15
1975] INFORMANT DISCLOSURE
1042(d) allows the judge to believe the informer rather than the
defendant on the entrapment issue. 113
Right To Counsel
The sixth amendment right to counsel is of modem origin." 4
It provides that the "accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.""'  This right has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to require "effective" and
"substantial assistance,""' not only at the criminal trial, but at all
"critical stages" in which "substantial rights" of an accused may
be affected. 117  Thus, counsel is required at a police lineup,"18
a preliminary hearing," 9 arraignment, 20 sentencing,' 2' and on
113. Section 1042(d) of the Evidence Code provides that the judge will make
his determination based upon the evidence presented at both the open and the in
camera hearings.
For example, drawing again from the hypothetical (see text accompanying
note 14 supra), Pusher might argue that he was hired by Informer to package
the marijuana. The prosecutor could subpoena Informer to the in camera hearing
to rebut this theory. Under section 1042(d) the judge could assess the credibil-
ity of Informer, even though this is normally a function of the jury.
Pusher could argue that nondisclosure would deprive him of a fair trial be-
cause entrapment must be tried to a jury. Nevertheless, no court has so limited
the scope of the in camera hearing. Thus, section 1042(d) allows the trial judge
in this instance to take the issue of entrapment away from the jury.
By the same token, the in camera hearing invades the province of the jury
in criminal libel trials (CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 248-57 (West 1970)), where the jury
has the right to determine both law and fact. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1125 (West
1970). Whenever informant communications are used as a basis for searches
which result in evidence of libel, the section 1042(d) hearing infringes on the
right to trial by jury, since juries in libel cases must decide every issue including,
arguably, the materiality of an informer.
114. F. HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT 109 (1951). At common law, the
participation of counsel was prohibited in ordinary felony cases, but was allowed
in misdemeanor and treason cases. The denial of counsel in criminal prosecutions
probably was a result of the absence of a criminal prosecutor: in England the
defendant was confronted only by the victim or an interested party. See 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 355 (T. Cooley ed.
1873). For a thorough study of the right to counsel, see W. BEANEY, THE RIrr
TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Note that there may be a fifth amendment
right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Comment,
The New Definition: A Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
604 (1967).
116. The right to "effective" assistance of counsel was established in Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), the celebrated "Scottsboro Boys" case.
117. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963); Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28 (1962); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961); People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757, 761, 401 P.2d 921,
923, 44 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (1965).
118. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
119. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
120. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
121. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948).
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appeal granted as a matter of right. 22 Since critical stages of the
criminal proceedings include all proceedings collateral to trial, a
closed section 1042(d) hearing would appear to deny "effective
and substantial" assistance of counsel to the defendant. Indeed,
the American Bar Association proposes that counsel be provided
in all proceedings arising from the initiation of a criminal action
against the accused. 12
3
The presence of defense counsel at every stage of a criminal
proceeding is an essential part of effective assistance of counsel.
In recognition of the important role of the defense advocate, the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence suggest a bilateral in camera
hearing.' The inclusion of defense counsel at disclosure hear-
ings would appear to be a minimum constitutional standard, bal-
ancing the defendant's right to representation with the prosecu-
tion's need to avoid public disclosure of the informer's identity.
As an officer of the court, the defense attorney would be under
a duty to refrain from disclosing the informer's identity.
The bilateral hearing, however, does not insure effective as-
sistance of counsel. The defense attorney may be reluctant to
ask his client questions about the informer for fear of disclosing
the informer's identity. As previously noted, 2 ' the attorney may
also need quick, continuous access to his client in order to cross-
examine the informer effectively. Furthermore, the client may
be able to provide factual information and defenses unknown to
his attorney in advance of the proceeding. In other words, effec-
tive assistance of counsel will require the attendance of the de-
fendant in many cases.
CONCLUSION
Sound judgment requires departure from section 1042(d).
The section 1042(d) ex parte, in camera hearing places a heavy
burden on the defense and the courts, limits discovery, and leaves
the accused effectively without an advocate. In addition, section
1042(d) arguably abridges several constitutional rights, including
the rights to confrontation, compulsory process, public trial, jury
trial, and counsel. Abridgement of these fundamental rights may
further result in the violation of due process of law.126 This ar-
122. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
123. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES rule 4.2 (Approved Draft 1968).
124. PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES rule 510(c)(3) (Mar. 1971) (adopted). See note 45 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
126. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution provide that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
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ticle has suggested that judicial abrogation of section 1042(d) can
and should be based on one of the grounds discussed.
Proponents of the in camera hearing want a middle ground
between disclosure and dismissal. The in camera hearing al-
legedly provides the trial judge with a better understanding of the
facts which may rebut the defense theory of materiality. A study
of the several alternatives to the in camera hearing, however, in-
dicates that there can be no middle ground.
In the bilateral in camera hearing, the defense counsel would
be allowed to attend, but the defendant would be excluded. 127
While this procedure has the advantage of providing the defend-
ant with an advocate, it places the defense counsel in the difficult
position of being privy to information which he or she cannot
share with the client. As an officer of the court, the lawyer can
be ordered not to disclose the information, but it is unrealistic to
assume that every attorney will obey. Furthermore, defense
counsel might be reluctant to ask the client questions about the
informer for fear of disclosing the informer's identity.
A second solution would be to create a special staff of public
defenders to act as defense advocates at the in camera hearing.
This proposal, however, would be unwieldy and would foist un-
wanted attorneys upon defendants who prefer private counsel.
A third alternative would be to exclude the prosecution as
well as the defense from the in camera hearing. The prosecutor
can be ordered to give the name of the informer to the judge,
who will then investigate the case. Judicial investigation will
place an additional burden on the trial judge, but it is arguably
fairer because it treats defense and prosecution equally. Mutual
exclusion was approved in People v. Woolman, 25 where the de-
fense and the district attorney were excluded from a hearing on
the materiality of an arresting officer's misconduct files. Never-
theless, the city attorney and the police officer witness attended
the hearing. 129  One critical problem with judicial investigation is
The California Constitution contains a similar provision. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §
13. Denial of the constitutional rights discussed above would automatically de-
prive the accused of the right to due process, for due process of law requires a
trial "which meets the minimum test of fairness required by the Constitution."
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 88 (1950).
127. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
128. 40 Cal. App. 3d 652, 115 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1974).
129. The court noted that "to require an adversary hearing with counsel would
destroy, at the outset, the very privilege which the hearing is designed to protect."
40 Cal. App. 3d at 655, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 326. However, the city attorney is
also a prosecutor and the police have good communication with the prosecutorial
sector of city government. Query whether the Woolman court applied a fair prin-
ciple in an unfair manner.
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that it bypasses a fundamental feature of our system of justice-
the adversary hearing.ao0
Until the Legislature assumes its burden of statutory reform,
the only viable judicial -alternative is a return to the old rule of
"disclose or dismiss" as set forth by the California Supreme Court
in People v. Garcia."' Under the rule of Garcia, once a defend-
ant makes a prima facie showing on the informer's materiality, the
burden is then on the prosecution either to disclose the informer's
identity or to incur a dismissal. Indeed, this is the best alternative
to section 1042(d) unless the state can show a compelling interest
in the in camera procedure. "Disclose or dismiss" is truly conson-
ant with the great principle of American jurisprudence which, in
a conflict between the rights of -the accused and the efficiency of
the state, strikes the balance in favor of the accused.
130. See text accompanying notes 32-57 supra.
131. 67 Cal. 2d 830, 833, 434 P.2d 366, 370, 65 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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